University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences - Papers: Part A

Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences

1-1-2012

Towards formalizing a reputation system for cheating detection in peer-topeer-based massively multiplayer online games
Willy Susilo
University of Wollongong, wsusilo@uow.edu.au

Yang-Wai Chow
University of Wollongong, caseyc@uow.edu.au

Rungrat Wiangsripanawan
rw26@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers
Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Susilo, Willy; Chow, Yang-Wai; and Wiangsripanawan, Rungrat, "Towards formalizing a reputation system
for cheating detection in peer-to-peer-based massively multiplayer online games" (2012). Faculty of
Engineering and Information Sciences - Papers: Part A. 28.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/28

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Towards formalizing a reputation system for cheating detection in peer-to-peerbased massively multiplayer online games
Abstract
The rapidly growing popularity of Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) has given rise to an
increase in the number of players world wide. MMOGs enable many players interact together through a
shared sense of presence created by the game. The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network topology overcomes
communication bottleneck problems associated with centralized client/server sys- tems. Thus, P2Pbased MMOGs are seen as the way of the future, and many dierent P2P-based MMOG architectures have
been proposed to date. However, many architectures are proposed in an ad hoc manner and enhancing
the security of such systems is an elusive research problem. In this paper, we address this important
issue by making the following contributions. Firstly, we formalize the notion of P2P-based MMOGs and
demonstrate that existing P2P-based MMOG architectures can be unied using our model. To our
knowledge, this is the rst time that this has been done in the literature. Secondly, we use our model to
develop a real-time cheating detection mechanism to identify cheating players, which can be used to
expose several MMOG cheating strategies. Finally, we propose a new reputation based system for P2Pbased MMOGs to enhance the cheating detection process.

Keywords
era2014, towards, detection, formalizing, massively, multiplayer, online, games, reputation, system, peer,
cheating

Disciplines
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies

Publication Details
Susilo, W., Chow, Y. & Wiangsripanawan, R. (2012). Towards formalizing a reputation system for cheating
detection in peer-to-peer-based massively multiplayer online games. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
7645 291-304.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/28

Towards Formalizing a Reputation System for Cheating Detection
in Peer-to-Peer-based Massively Multiplayer Online Games
Willy Susilo1⋆ , Yang-Wai Chow2 , and Rungrat Wiangsripanawan⋆⋆
1

Centre for Computer and Information Security Research
2
Centre for Multimedia and Information Processing
School of Computer Science and Software Engineering
University of Wollongong, Australia
{wsusilo, caseyc}@uow.edu.au
3
Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Science
King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology Ladkrabang, Bangkok, Thailand
kwrungra@kmitl.ac.th

Abstract. The rapidly growing popularity of Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) has
given rise to an increase in the number of players world wide. MMOGs enable many players interact
together through a shared sense of presence created by the game. The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network
topology overcomes communication bottleneck problems associated with centralized client/server systems. Thus, P2P-based MMOGs are seen as the way of the future, and many different P2P-based
MMOG architectures have been proposed to date. However, many architectures are proposed in an ad
hoc manner and enhancing the security of such systems is an elusive research problem. In this paper,
we address this important issue by making the following contributions. Firstly, we formalize the notion
of P2P-based MMOGs and demonstrate that existing P2P-based MMOG architectures can be unified
using our model. To our knowledge, this is the first time that this has been done in the literature.
Secondly, we use our model to develop a real-time cheating detection mechanism to identify cheating
players, which can be used to expose several MMOG cheating strategies. Finally, we propose a new
reputation based system for P2P-based MMOGs to enhance the cheating detection process.

Keywords: Massively Multiplayer Online Games, Peer-to-Peer architecture, cheating detection,
reputation system
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Introduction

Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) are online games which provide networked virtual environments where many players, typically ranging into the thousands, can interact with
other players through a shared sense of presence created by the game. In MMOGs, players might
physically be located all over the globe, but should be able to comfortably interact within the
shared environment. The popularity and success of MMOGs has led to an increase in the number
of users world wide. Consequently, the scalability of MMOG network architectures has become a
key challenge that has to be addressed.
To date, many successful MMOGs are predominantly based on the Client/Server (C/S) network
topology [8, 18]. In C/S systems, the centralized servers create a bottleneck as all communication
must pass through the servers. This gives rise to a single point of failure, and expensive game servers
have to be used to handle the large computational requirements of the system [12]. Furthermore,
this centralized approach results in a huge amount of network traffic at the server-side, increases
the communication latency between clients and inhibits the scalability of the system.
The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network topology on the other hand overcomes the communication
bottleneck problems associated with centralized servers by distributing computational load among
⋆
⋆⋆
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the peers [12]. This allows for greater scalability, avoids the cost of expensive servers, and potentially
reduces latency between interacting peers. As such, over the years researchers have proposed a
variety of scalable P2P-based network architectures for MMOGs [1–4, 7, 9, 11, 14, 15, 20, 26, 27, 31].
However, the issue of security is a key concern that has to be dealt with before any P2P
architecture can be used in the development of MMOGs, because cheating is rampant in MMOGs
[32]. Many of the proposed P2P-based MMOG architectures are designed for scalability, but do
not adequately handle the security of the system [1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 14, 15, 20, 27, 31]. In addition, several
of the proposed mechanisms to address cheating in P2P MMOGs are ad hoc solutions that cannot
be adopted in other systems [3, 11, 26].
Our Contributions. This paper addresses the important issue of security in diverse P2P-based
MMOG network architectures. The aim of our work is as follows:
– to encapsulate different P2P-based MMOG architectures using a single unifying model,
– to provide a generic security mechanism which can be used to identify cheating players, and
– to develop a new reputation system that can be adopted by diverse architectures to enhance
the cheating detection process.
We do this by formalizing the notion of P2P-based MMOG architectures, and show that our model
can be instantiated on different P2P-based MMOG architectures. This will then be used as the basis
for developing a real-time cheating detection mechanism, and we identify several MMOG cheating
strategies that our security mechanism will be able to detect. Finally we propose the design of a
new reputation-based system for P2P MMOGs which can be used in conjunction with our cheating
detection mechanism. We stress that our main goal is to develop a new model for existing P2Pbased MMOG architectures so that we can analyze their effectiveness based on a single unifying
model.

2
2.1

Background
P2P-based MMOG Network Architectures

C/S architectures are currently the dominant approach adopted by MMOG developers. One of the
primary reasons for its widespread use lies in the fact that it is easier to maintain security and to
mitigate cheating in C/S systems as compared to P2P systems, because the server-side is a trusted
system that is able to validate every action request sent by a client before carrying it out [8]. In
addition, sensitive data is stored on the server and the clients are never given access to it [12].
Nevertheless, the downside is that this increases computational load at the servers and creates a
communication bottleneck.
Security is much harder to maintain on P2P architectures as the data must be distributed and
stored among the peers, which makes it a difficult but important problem to solve. While a variety
of different P2P-based architectures for MMOGs have been proposed by the research community to
overcome the various limitations of C/S architectures, these P2P-based architectures can generally
be grouped into several broad categories. These will be described briefly in this section to provide
the necessary background to our work. We adopt the terminology and definitions used in [8, 21] to
represent the different types of P2P-based MMOG architectures. For a detailed survey, please refer
to [8, 21].
ALM based Protocols
In the Application Layer Multicast (ALM) approach, game events and messages are distributed
using standard ALM techniques. In many implementations, the virtual game world is partitioned
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into subspaces or spatial regions. Each region is represented by a dedicated multicast group, and
events within that region are sent to all relevant players in that region. Players only need to be
informed of events happening within a certain range in the virtual environment. This range is
known as the Area of Interest (AOI) and was a concept first introduced by Macedonia et al. [25].
In many cases, a player’s AOI is fully inside a single region. However, if a player’s AOI intersects
the border between regions, he/she also has to subscribe to the other region’s multicast group.
Examples of the ALM based protocol can be found in [10, 11, 17, 20, 28, 30].
Supernode based Protocols
Similar to the ALM approach, the virtual game world is also divided into spatial regions. In some
implementations, the region size is fixed [31], while in others, region sizes change dynamically
based on player density in order to balance computational load [9]. For each region, a supernode,
or superpeer, is selected and assigned as the coordinator for that region, effectively acting like a
region server. The supernode is responsible for receiving all game event messages within the region
and disseminating these to all players that are subscribed to that region. Supernode based protocols
are used in [7, 16, 18, 31]. These supernode models are all based on the assumption that there is a
way to choose a trustworthy node to act as the supernode for each region.
Mutual Notification based Protocols
This approach does not involve explicitly dividing the virtual game world into spatial regions.
Instead, players send messages directly to other players within their AOI. Thus, message and event
propagation delays are minimized. In mutual notification based protocols, players must be aware of
all other players within their AOI. As such, players must depend on their neighbors for information
regarding other players who have recently moved into their AOI. This protocol is used in [14, 15],
where each player computes a Voronoi diagram based on all known neighbors. Whenever a player
changes location, all neighbors must be notified so that they can updated their own local Voronoi
diagrams. Neighbors are added to, or removed from, a player’s notification list based on changes
in Voronoi diagram information. Even though the virtual game world is not explicitly divided into
spatial regions, in some sense the Voronoi diagrams still dynamically form non-uniform regions for
mutual notification.
2.2

Existing P2P MMOG Reputation Systems

A number of researchers have proposed reputation systems for P2P MMOGs. Huang et al. [16]
proposed REPS, a reputation management system for P2P MMOGs based on peer-rated reputations. In their approach, each user has a reputation value that is determined based on other users’
subjective opinions formed during interaction between the peers. These reputation values are stored
in trustworthy neighbours, akin to a supernode, that can be accessed distributively without the
need of a server. Trustworthy nodes are chosen using a selection criteria based on the reputations.
The problem with user assigned reputation systems is that they are subjective. This means that
they can be abused by malicious or disgruntle players who can collude and assign negative ratings
to their victims.
A non-subjective reputation system was proposed by Liu et al. [23]. In their approach, the
reliability of peers were computed based on whether communication among peers were received
timely and correctly in the process of synchronization. While this is a non-subjective approach where
peer reputations were calculated based on their proposed algorithms, the aim of their approach was
for quantifying the reliability of the peers in order to effectively distribute the computation and
communication load among the peers, rather than for addressing cheating in MMOGs.
Xiang-bin et al. [30] proposed a cheating detection mechanism based on fuzzy reputation management for P2P MMOGs. In their work, a player’s reputation is constantly updated based on the
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player’s game data history. To determine whether or not a player is a cheater, the player’s reputation is compared against a certain threshold. Instead of using a fixed threshold that is common to
all players, they propose a dynamically changing threshold for each individual player to minimize
false detection ratio. However, their system must rely on central servers to store individual player
reputations and thresholds.

3

Formal Model of P2P-based MMOG

In this section, we present a formal model of P2P-based MMOG systems. The formalization of a
P2P-based MMOG system is essential in order for us to analyze the security of the system, and to
add new functionality to the system. In the subsequent sections, we will demonstrate how to equip
a P2P-based MMOG system with a cheating detection mechanism based on the formal model, as
well as how to add a reputation-based system to determine cheating players.
3.1

High Level Description

The system described in this section will be a generic system that can be applied to the different
P2P-based MMOG architectures previously discussed. While MMOG architectures are extremely
complex systems that are made up of an amalgamation of diverse factors, many of these factors
do not directly relate to cheating detection. As such, we will only focus on factors that will aid
us in the task of detecting cheating peers. For example, P2P-based MMOGs may maintain a login
server, whose main tasks include checking player subscriptions before allowing players to join the
game, assigning a player to a region upon joining and providing initial information for the player
to link with his/her peers. We will not consider such factors in our model, as our focus is on the
P2P architecture that underlies the running of the in-game environment.
Typical P2P-based MMOG architectures are composed of a number of regions, whether fixed
sized, dynamically changing with respect to player density or determined based on player AOIs. In
many cases, a player’s AOI is fully contained within a single region. At any given time, a player
mainly resides in one of the defined regions. In which case, we say that the player is ‘subscribed’ to
that region. If a player’s AOI intersects the border of a neighboring region, then he/she has to also
subscribe to the other region. On the other hand, the player ‘unsubscribes’ from a certain region if
that region is no longer relevant to the player. Each region is identified with an ID, which may be
implemented by simply using a collision resistant hash function.
3.2

Formal Definition and Model

Setup
A P2P-based MMOG system comprises of n regions denoted as R = {R1 , · · · , Rn }. Each region,
Ri , is identified by an identity IDRi . When a user Ui resides in a region Rj , we denote it as Uij . Each
i }. The
region Ri contains m users at some stage, and therefore we denote it as U i = {U1i , U2i , · · · , Um
i
i
total number of users in U is denoted as |U |, which is equal to m in the above case. Each user in U i
moves and
is said to have ‘subscribed’ to Ri . This is illustrated in Fig. 1(a). When a user Uki ⊂ U i {
}
j
j := U j ∪ U j
i
interacts with Rj , we denote it as Uki↔j , which implies1 U|U
.
j |+1 := Uk and U
|U j |+1

i↔j1 ↔···↔jh
,
We note that this also means |U j | := |U j | + 1, since Uki has subscribed to R
{j . When
} Uk
α
α
. This reflects
this implies that for each α ∈ {j1 , · · · , jh }, U|U
:= Uki and U α := U α ∪ U|U
α |+1
α |+1
1

j
i
This means that the last user in the region Rj , which is U|U
j |+1 , is set to be the new incoming user Uk , and the

size of the set |U j | is increased by one.
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the situation in which a player’s position overlaps the borders of other regions. Fig. 1(b) shows
a depiction of this.{After
the completion of Uki↔j , meaning that the previous region is no longer
}
relevant, U i := U i \ Uki must occur, and consequently |U i | := |U i |−1. This represents the situation
where Uki leaves Ri , and so Uki must ‘unsubscribe’ from Ri .
Let δmin denote the minimum number of users required for a region to be formed. Where
δmin := 0, means that there is no restriction on the minimum number of users.

(a) Users in the Regions

(b) Movement of U21 to R2

(c) Data Storage of each peer

Fig. 1. Region, Nodes and Data Storage

Data Storage
In order to maintain the state of the game in P2P MMOGs, the peers need to store information
about the state of the virtual game environment (e.g. Non-Player Characters (NPCs)), as well
as the states of the other peers including his/her own. For supernode architectures, most of this
information is stored in a single peer for each region. Three different lists need to be maintained
by Uki to record information about the environment and the other peers in that region. These are
to be implemented as queues. Let:
– VS k := {VS 1k , · · · , VS tk } be the list of ‘virtual player states’. These states contain the data of
all player in the region. Player data might include Health Points (HP), experience points, level,
money, items, attributes, etc.
– PS k := {PS 1k , · · · , PS tk } be the list of ‘physical states’. This records the players real world
information such as connection speed, average message transmission time, latency, etc.
– ES k := {ES 1k , · · · , ES tk } be the list of ‘virtual environment states’. This is used to store information about non-player entities in the game environment, for example the state of NPCs.
The number of states maintained in the queue is represented by t. This means that if t is set to 10,
the last ten states will be stored. As mentioned, this information is stored by Uki , which might be
a single peer in the case of a supernode architecture, or |U i | peers otherwise. Since VS k and PS k
encompasses the data of all players in the region, both virtual and physical, this is denoted as
(
)
(
)
|U i |
|U i |
VS lk , PS lk := {VS 1k , · · · , VS k }, {PS 1k , · · · , PS k }
we abuse the notation as VS lk [j], where l = 1, · · · , t and j = 1, · · · , |U i | to denote
VS lk [j] := VS jk
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and PS lk [j], where l = 1, · · · , t and j = 1, · · · , |U i | to denote
PS lk [j] := PS jk
respectively.
Additionally, Uki needs to maintain the state of the virtual environment ES k := {ES 1k , · · · , ES tk }.
For a region that has n non-player entities
(
)
ES lk := ES 1k , · · · , ES nk
Therefore, in total user Uki in region Ri needs to store
t(2|U i | + n)
information to record the game environment states, as well as the virtual and physical states of all
players in the region. Fig. 1(c) shows the information that is stored by the peers, or superpeers.
Note that to deter cheating, in certain P2P MMOG implementations the user is not allowed to
store his/her own state [24].
Communication
Let δsend denote the set of peers that each user needs to report
{ }its states to for every single update
cycle. For Uki , δsend is defined as δsend := {1, · · · , |U i |} ̸= Uki for Ri . At times the choice of the
peers may be defined by proximity gathered from the physical states of other peers PS k . A special
case happens when δsend := {1}, since each user needs to report its states to a designated user, Ri ,
in Ri . This designated user is often known as the supernode, which is selected using a selection
scheme from among the users in Ri .
3.3

Instantiating the Model

Here, we show how our formal model can be instantiated and applied to the existing types of
P2P-based MMOG architectures that were described in section 2.1.
ALM based Protocols
In this architecture, the game world is typically divided into subspaces, and hence will be represented as a collection of Ri ’s in our model. A collection of players U i reside in Ri and maintain
their respective Area of Interests (AOIs). The way the user subscribes and unsubscribes to a region,
based on their AOIs, is as per our model. Typical MMOGs divided the game world into square or
hexagon based subspaces. Hence, Fig. 2(a) depicts how Ri in our model can be applied to hexagon
subspaces. Similarly, our model can easily be applied to square based subspaces.
Supernode based Protocols
Supernode based protocols are similar to ALM based protocols in that they are region based. The
difference being the existence of a responsible node, called the supernode in each subspace. This
follows our model where δsend = 1, and hence, R is the supernode. Refer to Fig. 2(b).
Mutual Notification based Protocols
Unlike the ALM and supernode based protocols, mutual notification based protocols do not explicitly divide the game world into rigid subspaces. Each player interacts with other peers in the
system, when their proximities are closed to each other. Since they compute proximities using some
method, for example by constructing a Voronoi diagram, these Voronoi regions can be clustered
into the Ri regions represented in our model. Peers within Ri indicate the neighbors in which a
node directly communicates with. This is illustrated in Fig. 2(c), the circles are examples of how
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Ri would be formed around the Voronoi regions (note that only a few are shown to avoid over
cluttering the Fig.). The difference between mutual notification based protocols as compared to
the previous two protocols, is that this approach is based on dynamically changing regions, which
are non-uniform. Hence, in Fig. 2(c) the circle sizes are non-uniform. There must be a minimum
number of users required in order to define a region, namely δmin .

(a) ALM based Protocols

(b) Supernode based Protocols

(c) Mutual Notification based Protocols

Fig. 2. Instantiations of Our Model

4

Cheating Detection

In this section, we present a cheating detection mechanism based on the formal model defined
in the preceding section. Our method utilizes the existing data, required to run the P2P-based
MMOG, that is already stored by the peers, or supernodes. The main principle adopted in the
development of this approach is that a suspicious player’s data will differ from the norm, which
can be determined based on the past states that are stored and from a consensus among the other
peers. In addition, once off cheats are rare because they do not give significant advantage to the
cheater. As such, typical cheating strategies are continuously executed over many cycles, hence,
cheaters can be identified by our cheating detection approach.
4.1

Detecting Suspicious Behavior

Before defining the cheating action, let
β ∈ {1, · · · t − 1}, γES := CompES (ES lk , ES l+β
k )
β ∈ {1, · · · t − 1}, j ∈ {1, · · · |U i |, j ̸= k}, γVS := CompVS (VS lk [j], VS l+β
k [j])
β ∈ {1, · · · t − 1}, j ∈ {1, · · · |U i |, j ̸= k}, γPS := CompPS (PS lk [j], PS l+β
k [j])
where CompES , CompVS , CompPS define the comparison functions for virtual environment states, virtual player states and physical states, respectively. Depending on the nature of the game, these
functions could be as simple as a substraction function, an XOR operation, or something more
complex. To reduce a peer’s computational load, these functions do not have to be executed every
single cycle. Instead, they can be executed sporadically at random intervals, and only increasing
the number of executions when a potentially suspicious player is detected.
These functions are used to identify in-game cheating behavior. The cheating action that can be
identified by CompES are those where the cheater tries to propagate false game environment states,
for example, killing a strong NPC in a single blow, or falsifying the type or amount of an item
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in the environment which is not currently owned by any of the peers. CompVS is used to identify
whether a cheater tries to maliciously modify his/her own player status, for instance, inappropriately
increasing his/her HP, moving through walls or moving at impossible speeds, duplicating an item
that he/she owns, etc. CompPS on the other hand is used for detecting network cheats like trying
to delaying event propagation to other peers, or changing an update messages’ timestamp.
We define a function CheatDetect(ID) that invokes the following:
– A user Uki in Ri suspects that there is a user, Uℓi , in Ri that is cheating.
– Uki will multicast IDℓ to all other peers in Ri , in order for them to check and verify this suspicion.
– All other peers in Ri will check and determine for themselves whether or not the user with
IDℓ is cheating and multicast the same ID to all peers if this is found to be true. If the same
ID is received more than once within a certain timeframe, it will be ignored to avoid network
congestion due to message flooding.
– If a certain number of ‘votes’ given by the peers is obtained, a consensus is reached and the
suspected user will be marked as a cheater. If no consensus is reached, the data will be ignored,
and the situation will return to the status quo.
The function CheatDetect(ID) accepts ID of the suspected user as its input, and it outputs either
⊤ or ⊥, to indicate whether or not IDiℓ is a cheater. Note that the voting system can be enhanced
by using a reputation system. In other words, a vote from a peer with a higher reputation will have
a greater weight in the overall decision. This will be elaborated in section 5, which describes our
reputation system.
Specifically, a user Uki may suspect that Uℓi is cheating if γES > t̃ and/or γVS > t̃ and/or
i ∈ U i , where
γPS > t̃, for a defined threshold t̃. When this condition occurs, Uki multicasts IDℓ to Um
j
i
i
i
m = {1, · · · , |U |}, m ̸= {k, ℓ}. Upon receiving IDℓ , each Um ∈ U will check ES m and (VS lm , PS lm )
j+β
β ∈ {1, · · · t − 1}, γES := CompES (ES jm , ES m
)

β ∈ {1, · · · t − 1}, γVS := CompVS (VS lm [ℓ], VS l+β
m [ℓ])
β ∈ {1, · · · t − 1}, γPS := CompPS (PS lm [ℓ], PS l+β
m [ℓ])
and subsequently, if any of these comparisons indicate that Uℓi has interfered with the update
messages, tampered with the data or performed a suspicious action, IDℓ will be multicasted to
i ∈ U i , where m = {1, · · · , |U i |}, m ̸= {k, ℓ}. Let t̄ denote the threshold required to judge
Um
whether or not a user is a cheater. The value of t̄ must be based on the total number of users in the
region, i.e. |U i |. If the number of IDℓ received is greater than t̄, Uℓi is identified as a cheater, and
the output of CheatDetect(IDik ) will be ⊤. Otherwise, if when the number of IDℓ received given a
number of cycles is less than t̄ , then its output will be ⊥. Depending on the design of the game, a
cheater may immediately be kicked from the game, and have his/her account suspended or banned
from joining the game in future.
In a supernode architecture, Uki is a trusted peer and is responsible for identifying cheaters
without the help of other peers. In this case, ES, VS and PS are stored in the supernode. Thus,
the supernode itself will run CompES , CompVS , CompPS , and collect this information over a number
of cycles before determining the output of CheatDetect(ID).
4.2

Cheating Techniques in P2P-based MMOG

Here, we elaborate several cheating strategies that can be launched by malicious players. We limit
our discussion to cheating mechanisms that are related to P2P MMOG architectures. In addition,
our method deals with in-game type cheating techniques. Therefore, we do not examine cheating
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methods like login cheats or system administrator abuse, as they are not relevant to our discussion.
We adapt the terminology of cheating strategies from [32].
Cheating by Exploiting Misplaced Trust
This is a common MMOG cheating mechanism that involves tampering with game code, configuration data, or both, and hence, requires reverse engineering on the client/peer’s side. The malicious
user, the cheater, can then modify the game client data to whatever value he/she wants. Alternatively, the cheater can also modify the game client in order to alter sensitive game states on the
fly. This type of cheating can be detected in our architecture by observing past and present data,
which may be stored in a supernode or shared among multiple peers. Specifically, if the cheater
attempts to modify the current state of the game, the system can identify this suspicious behavior
by comparing this with t previous states using the set of Comp functions. This detects cheats like
increasing a player’s attributes, “speed hacks”, “duping items”, etc.
Cheating by Modifying Client Infrastructure
The cheater can modify the client infrastructure such as device drivers in his/her operating system.
By doing this, for instance, the cheater can make walls transparent (this is known as “wall hack”).
In previous work by Laurens et al. [22], they detected “wall hacks” by incorporating the concept of
a trace. Essentially, the virtual states of the each player has to be observed to determine precisely
what the player is looking at. The frequency of illegal traces can identify the case where a player
keeps looking at objects that the player cannot actually see. Alternatively, suspicious behavior can
be determined if a player continually ’stares at a wall’, because this is invisible to him/her. Our
detection mechanism can handle this type of cheats by storing and observing the frequency of
suspicious behavior over a number of cycles.
Timing Cheating
In this type of cheating mechanism, the cheating player choose to delay his/her own move until
he/she knows all the opponents’ moves, and hence, gaining a huge advantage. This type of cheating
strategy can be detected by using our cheating detection mechanism as information about the
physical states for each player is recorded. By observing the physical states of each peer, our system
can determine artificially induced delays or when message timestamps are modified.
Cheating by Exploiting Lack of Secrecy
This type of cheating strategy is performed by illegally accessing game data (or states). This
situation can arise in our model if the cheater can somehow obtain the contents of the queues. In
general, combating this is straightforward as the state information for each player can be encrypted
with a symmetric algorithm, such as AES. Assuming the security of the algorithm is hard (which is
the case for the state-of-the-art AES algorithm), this cheating strategy will be rendered ineffective.

5

Adding a Reputation System to P2P-based MMOGs

This section presents our reputation system that is to be embedded into the P2P-based MMOG
architecture. We employ a reputation system that is inspired by EigenTrust [19], X2 Rep [6] and
X2BT Rep [33] which have been designed for use in P2P networks. Nevertheless, we should stress that
the reputation systems proposed in P2P networks cannot directly be used in P2P-based MMOGs.
This is because in many large-scale cutting-edge MMOGs, the game itself requires tremendous computational resources to run and all this computation has to be performed in real-time. Any delays,
due to network latency or processing load, can severely impact the players’ in-game experience.
Therefore, the aim of any cheating detection mechanism or reputation system in MMOGs is
to provide a decent level of security without over burdening the system. On the other hand, the
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main goal of reputation systems in traditional file-sharing P2P networks is to measure the validity
of the download resources offered by determining the level of trust of the other peers; Real-time
performance and computational load are not the main driving factors.
Hence, we need to build a new reputation system that is suitable for P2P-based MMOG systems.
One of the main principles that we employ in the development of our reputation system, is that
in MMOGs the main purpose of each individual peer is to protect the player himself/herself, as
opposed to trying to protect the entire system.
5.1

High Level Idea

The main idea underlying the reputation system is as follows. Each user is equipped with a list of
reputations of all peers in the region. The user will not store his/her own reputation. When a new
user joins a region Ri , the user is given a default reputation ∆. Note that ∆ cannot be zero, since a
reputation of zero will prevent the user from join the MMOG game in the first place (this is known
as “cold start” in P2P-based reputation system). Upon joining Ri , the user contacts the peers in
Ri to obtain the reputation of other peers. When used in cheating detection, a peer’s voting weight
can be adjusted based on the value of the peer’s reputation. Hence, a user with higher reputation
will contribute more weight towards determining whether or not another peer is a cheater. In a
similar manner, once a user moves into another region, the user needs to contact the peers in that
region to acquire the reputation values of the other peers. The user’s reputation in that new region
will be calculated based on the reputation given by the peers in the region that he/she just left.
This can easily be adapted to a supernode system, where the reputation list would be computed
and stored at the supernode. When a user move to a different region, the new region’s supernode
needs to get the user’s reputation from the previous region’s supernode. If a supernode changes
region, a new supernode is selected and the list is transferred to the new supernode.
5.2

System Design

Each user Uki in Ri is equipped with a list of reputations:
Repik := ∀ℓ=1,··· ,|U i |,ℓ̸=k {Repiℓ }
We use Repiℓ to denote the reputation of user Uℓi who resides in region Ri . The list is kept by user
Uki to represent user Uki ’s view on the other peers.
User Joining a Region
When user Uk enters region Ri (hence, Uki ), Uki queries δsend peers to acquire the reputation of all
other peers in order to fill Repik . When there is more than one response received, Repik is filled with
the average of the responses. If there exists ∀ℓ=1,··· ,|U i |,ℓ̸=k {Repiℓ } = ∅, then the peer needs to query
other peers in Ri . At the end of this process, Uki acquires a complete Repik . Other peers Uji ∈ U i
will assign to Uki with a reputation of ∆.
Moving to Another Region
When Uki↔j , Uki queries δsend peers in Rj to acquire all other peer reputations and gather Repjk .
Additionally, since Uki has now moved to Rj (hence, Ukj ), the peers in Rj will have to update their
records to contain Ukj ’s reputation. However, since Ukj does not store his/her own reputation, the
peers in Rj will have to acquire Ukj ’s reputation from δsend users in Ri . Similarly, the same process
is done when Uki↔j1 ···jh .
Using the Reputation
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The reputation information is used to enhance the quality of the votes given by the peers. When
Uki suspects that Udi is cheating, Uki invokes CheatDetect(IDd ). Upon receiving the ID-s from Uℓi ,
where Uℓi ∈ U i , ℓ ̸= {d, k} computes
∑
Res =
Repiℓ × IsID(IDd , IDℓ ).
∀ℓ∈{1,··· ,|U i |},ℓ̸={d,k}

The function IsID(IDd , IDℓ ) will return 1, if IDd has been returned by user IDℓ , or 0 otherwise.
If Res > t̄, for a threshold t̄ as defined earlier in section 4.1, then the user Udi will be marked
as a cheater. We call this system a credibility algorithm in P2P-based MMOGs. When a user is
identified as a cheater, then his/her reputation is marked as 0.
Reputation Update
If a user Uℓi submits IDd during a cheating detection phase, and IDd is eventually marked as a
cheater (which means, that IDd ’s reputation is marked as 0), then Uℓi ’s reputation that is stored
on the other peers should be updated as Repiℓ := Repiℓ + ξ. The value ξ is used to increase the
reputation of Uℓi , because the user correctly identified a cheater Uℓi should now be seen as a more
trustworthy peer. A typical value that is used during implementation is 0.05, which is similar to
the reputation system used in BitTorrent (X2 BT -Rep [33]).
Conversely, if a user Uℓi submits IDd during a cheating detection phase, but IDd is eventually
declared to be a non-cheater (i.e. the threshold t̄ criteria is not met), then Repiℓ := Repiℓ − cξ, where
c ∈ {2, · · · }. This essentially means that if a user votes wrongly, then the ‘penalty’ given is linear
to ξ. In contrast, if a correct vote is cast, then the reputation is increased by ξ. This is because a
user will normally only vote incorrectly if his/her data diverges significantly from the norm, which
indicates that the user is less trustworthy, possibly indicating that he/she has tampered with the
system.
While it is conceivable that a player could hack his/her system to avoid submitting votes entirely,
thereby never having other peers increase or decrease his/her reputation, this in no way benefits
the player as there is nothing that the player gains from withholding votes. Moreover, in a MMOG
system which hosts thousands of players, the chances of having many players hacking their system
to withhold votes for no apparent benefit, is extremely remote to have any significant impact on
the reputation system. However, it is possible that a player, or a group of players, might be able to
reverse engineer their system to maliciously vote against other players in order to kick them out of
the game. This is discussed in the section below.
5.3

Security Considerations

A number of security issues that occur in P2P-based MMOG systems are discussed here. In particular, we focus our discussion on security issues faced by P2P MMOG architectures with our
reputation system in place.
Pseudospoofing
The idea of this attack is as follows. A malicious user registers with the system, behaves in a corrupt
manner for a while and then re-register with the system (by quitting and rejoining the game) to
re-initialize his/her reputation. With a re-initialized reputation the user can now falsely accuse
another user of being malicious during a cheating detection phase.
i
i
is ∆. After behavjoin Ri . The initial reputation assigned to Ucorrupt
Specifically, let Ucorrupt
i
ing maliciously, ∆ will be significantly reduced. Now when Ucorrupt re-registers as Uci , the user’s
reputation will be re-initialized to ∆. With this reputation, Uci can now start to vote maliciously
and accuse others of cheating. However, Uci will not gain any significant benefit from this action,
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because assuming the value ∆ that has been chosen is sufficiently small and |U i | is sufficiently large,
then this malicious activity will be ineffective in our reputation system algorithm, as the sum of
the other votes will out-weight Uci ’s vote.
Reputation Spoofing
In this type of attack, the malicious user attempts to find some vulnerabilities in the reputation
algorithm and spoof the reputation values. This may be achieved by conducting reverse engineering
on the software. Using our reputation system, this attack is ineffective as the reputation for a user is
not determined nor stored by the user himself/herself, but rather is determined based on the other
peers’ view of this particular user. The peers in the system gain reputation when voting correctly,
as their reputation will increase. Hence, by providing this mechanism, only the peers that vote
correctly will benefit from this reputation system.
Whitewashing Attack
This is the common attack on the eBay online transaction system. Essentially, this means that
a malicious user actively participates in the system by providing genuine items, but sometimes
provides a small number of inferior goods to be sold to others [13, 29]. In our scenario, consider a
user Uki who is actively involved in the system by voting correctly whenever asked. Nevertheless,
occasionally, this user also deliberately votes incorrectly. Note that our reputation system uses the
formula Repiℓ := Repiℓ +ξ to increase the value of the reputation, whilst the formula Repiℓ := Repiℓ −cξ,
where c ∈ {2, · · · } is used to decrease the value of the reputation. The range of c starts from 2,
which means that the ‘penalty’ is more severe for incorrect votes as compared to the reward given
by voting correctly. For example, if c = 10, this refers to the case the reputation gained from 10
correct votes will completely be negated by a single incorrect vote. This way, whitewashing attacks
will be ineffective.
Reputation Attacks by Collectives
This attack is achieved when malicious users know each other and they collaboratively seek to harm
the system by acting as a group. An example of this kind of attacks in the P2P system is known
as shilling. Instead of creating multiple identities as in the pseudospoofing attack, the attackers
maintain several true identities to influence the voting process. This is protected by the parameter
t̄ that controls the value of the threshold in the system. Unless all users are malicious, which will
make the system totally ineffective, this attack is prevented by our reputation system.

6

Conclusion

The increasing number of MMOG players world wide has exposed the problem of scalability in C/S
based MMOG architectures. As such, many researchers have proposed scalable P2P-based MMOG
architectures. However, cheating is a common occurrence in MMOGs and this is not adequately
handled in many of these proposed P2P systems. The security of a MMOG network architecture is
an important issue that has to be addressed before the architecture can be used in the development
of a game. Many proposed security mechanisms for P2P MMOG systems are specialized solutions
and cannot be realized on other systems.
This paper addresses this vital issue by formalizing the notion of diverse P2P-based MMOG
architectures into a single unifying model. We demonstrated that our formal model can be used
to instantiate different P2P-based MMOG architectures. Based on this model, this paper presents
a generic cheating detection mechanism that can be used to detect a number of different MMOG
cheating strategies. In addition, we described a reputation system that can be used to further
enhance the cheating detection process and describe its robustness against a number of attacks.
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